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Modi-nomics and the Politics of Institutional Change in the Indian Economy 





The term ‘Modi-nomics’ gained widespread publicity across India and resonated 
internationally during the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) campaign for the 2014 general 
elections. Named after the BJP’s star campaigner and then Prime Ministerial candidate, 
Narendra Modi, Modi-nomics refers to his success as Chief Minister in Gujarat, a state richer, 
with faster GDP growth, more jobs and industry than most other Indian states. The 2014 
campaign promised that the ‘Gujarat model’ of clean government and economic competence, 
could be replicated across the country. 
 
In our paper we identify the promises and premises behind Modi-nomics. We take stock of 
claims and criticism, drawing on comparative development statistics to discuss a much lauded 
but also highly contested ‘success’ story. To assess whether Modi-nomics is guiding policy 
we draw upon Douglas North’s new institutionalism. In addition, we use a sociological 
understanding of institutions to argue that a central component of Modi-nomics is to achieve 
economic change by altering perceptions and images as well as policy. However, Modi-
nomics remains highly contested within India’s domestic political arena and has unleashed 
other political entrepreneurs drawing on politics of entitlement (the Patel agitation) or 
religious sensibilities (the beef ban controversy). To gain resilience, Modi-nomics will have to 
combine ideational and institutional change and to reconcile the tensions arising in the 
process.  
	
Keywords: Narendra Modi, Modi-nomics, Gujarat model, institutional change, political 
entrepreneur.  





According to Douglas North the agent of change is an entrepreneur who perceives and acts 
upon opportunities arising from an alteration in the external context, the acquisition of skills 
and learning or a combination of both. In this reading, institutional change is a deliberate 
process, contingent upon perceptions and highly susceptible to political competition and 
conflict. Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power on the wave of a landslide electoral 
victory in 2014 and a campaign that widely championed his administrative experience as 
Chief Minister in the State of Gujarat along with his ‘Gujarat model’ of economic 
development. Modi’s political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been associated 
with cultural nationalism (based on the ideology of Hindutva) and the pursuit of politics based 
on religion and identity. However, observers noted that 2014 was the first general election in 
India where matters of the economy occupied centre stage and the pursuit of economic 
reforms as well as economic growth were explicit promises. Narendra Modi was the face of 
an election campaign that projected new issues and drew upon new resources such as social 
media and technology. Given the focus on the economy during the election campaign we 
explore the role that economic ideas and policy play as instruments of change.  
 
Modi-nomics is a popular and largely media-generated term, one that has been criticised for 
being vague. However, it has come to refer to a number of ideas and policies associated with 
and advocated by Narendra Modi and his government. These include improving the country’s 
business environment (through enhanced efficiency and transparency), investing in 
infrastructure, a focus on manufacturing, skills and vocational training and the harnessing of 
technology for economic development. In many articles the term Modi-nomics is equated with 
a style of economic governance, where Modi is depicted as being `an efficient, tough and 
incorruptible administrator´ (Ghatak and Roy 2014). On the other hand, Modi-nomics has 
been criticised for not having a well-articulated vision and concrete policies, in contrast for 
instance with Abenomics the eponymous term used to refer to Modi’s Japanese counterpart, 
Shinzo Abe’s economic philosophy and programme (Inamdar 2013). Nonetheless, the term 
‘Modi-nomics’ has become a moniker and serves to focus attention on the reality and rhetoric 
behind the current government’s economic agenda. Having contested an election with the 
promises of delivering growth, jobs and poverty-alleviation, the stakes are high and the 
regime’s first year elicited extensive scrutiny and analysis.  
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Although the economy was meant to be the government’s priority, the eruption of movements 
like the Patel agitation in Gujarat or the Dadri lynching incident in Uttar Pradesh is a constant 
reminder of how the polity and economy are inextricably interlinked. The Patel agitation 
earlier this year, galvanised frustration about lack of jobs and opportunities into a movement 
against the quota system in Modi’s own state of Gujarat. The second event came in the wake 
of widespread controversies surrounding a government-led initiative to ban cow slaughter and 
the sale and consumption of beef. On 28 September 2015, based on the rumour that beef had 
been eaten in his household on the occasion of Eid, a Muslim family was attacked and the 
father, killed. The politics of Mandal and Mandir, caste reservations and religion respectively, 
have long played a role in Indian politics. Furthermore, they both have connections to 
traditional constituencies within the BJP – the Patels in Gujarat and the beef-ban lobby. As a 
result, the government is vulnerable to agents from within, promoting and pursuing a politics 
of grievances and intolerance. How far, Prime Minister Modi, as political entrepreneur can 
remain in control of, and maintain the focus on an economic agenda, resolving disagreements 
and mediating within his party in order to deliver on the electoral promise of ‘sabka saath, 
sabka vikas’ (`Together with all, Development for all´) is a crucial question. Before coming to 
an analysis of Modi’s economic policies and political constraints we first examine the state of 
the Indian economy. 
 
I. India: Fastest Growing Market Economy.  
 
India’s economic growth is currently back at more than 7 per cent and it is predicted to be the 
world’s fastest growing economy in 2015 and 2016.1 Economic growth between 1990 and 
2014 averaged 6.9 per cent per year – with accelerated growth rates between 2003 and 2010 
of 7.9 per cent to 10.3 per cent (with the notable exception of the international financial crisis 
year of 2008 when growth was a mere 3.9 per cent). In 2011, the growth rate slowed down 
due to declining investments for a number of reasons including high interest rates, growing 
inflation and a general pessimism about the government’s will and capacity to instigate 
further economic reforms. India’s growth figures fell to a decade low (aside from the crisis 
	
1 The IMF reports in its World Economic Outlook an Indian growth rate of 7.3% for 2014 – the same 
as China. The IMF furthermore predicts India to grow at 7.3% (2015) respectively 7.5% (2016). This 
would make India the fastest growing market economy – ahead of China with 6.8% (2015) and 6.3% 
(2016) and well ahead of the predicted global growth rate (3.1% in 2015 and 3.6% in 2016) and the 
overall growth rate in emerging market and developing economies (4.0% in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016). 
See International Monetary Fund (2015, 2). 
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year 2008) caused by macroeconomic imbalances such as the country’s deep fiscal and 
current account deficits and mounting cases of corruption. The 2014 general elections spurred 
great optimism about the prospect of further reforms, in the aftermath of a sweeping victory 
by the BJP.2 Given the sensitivity of stock markets to future orientations it was telling that 
Mumbai’s benchmark Sensex index rose 15 per cent between the announcement of the 
elections in early March, and the declaration of Modi’s victory on May 16, 2014. 
 
The recent figures, coinciding with worries about a slowing Chinese economy and a general 
pessimism with regards to emerging economies, have turned India into a bright spot in the 
world economy. This is remarkable given that when Narendra Modi took over as Prime 
Minister the economy was suffering from inflation at 9 per cent, declining industrial 
production, a severe balance of payments deficit. Overall the situation of bottlenecks and 
suspended projects often led to the UPA regime being described as a government gripped by 
‘policy paralysis’ (Pannu 2014).  
 
While many blame or credit exogenous conditions for past and current performance 
respectively, most economists agree that domestic factors are key. During a discussion on the 
outlook for Asian emerging markets at the 2014 World Economic Forum Planning 
Commission deputy chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia stated, `India's government cannot 
blame the country's flat growth entirely on the global economy ... roughly a third of its 
slowdown could be attributed to cyclic downturn and two-thirds to domestic factors´ (The 
Economic Times 2014). 
 
The real economy thus was the focus of the general election in May 2014. Not only did the 
elections results mark a clear clarion call for change by delivering the BJP a two thirds 
majority in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India's Bicameral-Parliament), it was also the 
first election fought and won on the basis of an electoral campaign openly committed to pro-
market reforms (See Bharatiya Janata Party 2014). This, it has been pointed out makes 
Narendra Modi the first genuinely post-socialist political leader of India. Furthermore, not 
only is Modi the first sitting Chief Minister to have been appointed as Prime Minister, he is 
also the country’s first leader born after Independence in 1947. To assess the implications and 
impact of three factors: (1) ideology, (2) experience and (3) generational shift, we turn to a 
discussion of the claims of and contentions over Modi-nomics. 	
2 For details and analysis of the 2014 elections see: Mitra and Schöttli 2016 (forthcoming). 
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II. The Promise and Premises of Modi-nomics. 
 
Making 5827 appearances across the country – including rallies, events as well as his 
appearance in the form of a 3D hologram– for the run-up to the 2014 general elections and 
introducing town hall style addresses termed, Chai pe Charcha ('conversation over tea'), Modi 
vastly outpaced his main contender from the Congress Party, Rahul Gandhi.3  Criss-crossing 
the country, Modi promoted a message that was to a large extent focused on the economy. We 
analyse this in terms of the ideas behind Modi-nomics as conveyed during the campaign. 
Next, his record in Gujarat as Chief Minister sheds light on the degree to which improvements 
in the state can be attributed to his policies. As a third point, we turn to the proposition that 
Modi represents a post-socialist generation and era of development in the Indian economy.  
 
The Ideas behind Modi-nomics 
 
Judging from Modi’s speeches during the 2014 campaign his agenda rested upon promises to 
rationalise and reform government. Whether or not these claims have carried through into the 
BJP government’s agenda will be explored further on in the paper. An oft-repeated line, ‘Less 
Government, More Governance’ proclaimed the need to rationalise the role of government in 
its impingement on the lives of common citizens as well as its impact on the business 
environment. Specific steps promised under this slogan, included reforming the tax regime, 
simplifying the system and enhancing transparency. Aimed at reducing the arm of the state, 
this measure was supposed to help tackle the problem of black money and encourage citizens 
to file their tax returns. According to various media reports, only 3 per cent of Indians paid 
income tax in 2014 marking a major shortfall in government finances. Rather rashly and, it 
has been suggested, under pressure from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the BJP’s 
organisational and ideological wing, the Modi campaign regularly promised to set up a task 
force to bring back India’s black money stashed abroad and to distribute this money amongst 
honest tax payers. Whilst this clearly played to the galleys, it also fitted into the general 
promise of providing good governance and clear government and the restoration of trust in 
and efficiency of the bureaucracy. 
 
	
3 On Narendra Modi´s homepage it is claimed to be the `Largest Mass Outreach Campaign in Electoral 
History of a Democracy´ (Modi 2014). 
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A second leitmotif throughout the Modi campaign was the argument that reducing the role of 
government in some areas did not mean a withdrawal of the State. To the contrary, Modi was 
a persistent promoter of government as a provider of ‘public goods’, namely heavy 
infrastructure such as railways and urban development. The promise to build one hundred 
‘smart’ cities may sound like a tall order but it draws attention to a crucial feature of the 
Indian economy. India currently has the largest rural population in the world at 857 million 
and an urban population of 410 million. It is expected that India will add 404 million urban 
dwellers between 2014 and 2050 (United Nations 2015). 
 
A corollary to the urban focus and infrastructural promise is the need to enhance human 
capital. Here the stated priority during the election campaign was not only the need to create 
jobs but also to train people through vocational and skill-development programmes. Thanks to 
India’s demographic dividend of a growing and youthful population, the government projects 
the labour force to increase by 88 to 113 million people between 2010 and 2020 (OECD 
2014). At the same time, in order to break out of the trap of widespread poverty, it is also 
necessary to tackle the informal sector, which continues to generate low-paying, insecure and 
low-skilled jobs (ibid.). 
 
The focus on an urban and largely middle-class segment of society led to critics pointing out 
that Modi was ignoring the vast majority of Indians who continued to live in rural India and to 
a large extent in poverty. World Bank and India’s census data reveals that slightly less than 
half of the country’s labour force works in agriculture and more than 833 million people live 
in rural areas. Only 40 per cent of the population have access to improved sanitation facilities 
(World Bank 2015b). In response to his critics, Modi often showcased his achievements as 
Chief Minister where he was able to revitalise both industry and agricultural sectors of the 
economy. An additional premise for his success and one could argue, a cornerstone in his 
vision of economic policy is the argument that power needs to be decentralised to the States. 
To explore this further, we turn to the so-called ‘Gujarat model’. 
 
Modi’s Record in Gujarat 
 
The Gujarat model resonated with voters during the national election campaign. In his 
speeches Modi was quick to point to his success as the State’s Chief Minister of more than 12 
and a half years. The state’s annual GDP growth averaged almost 10 per cent, faster than the 
Schottli Pauli 2016 Modi-nomics & the politics of institutional change in the Indian economy. (Accepted Manuscript) 
 
	 7	
country as a whole with nearly 8 per cent. (See Table 1.) In this period only Andhra Pradesh 
performed better with an average growth rate of 10.5 per cent. Furthermore, he often 
challenged Rahul Gandhi on his lack of experience, contrasting it with his long administrative 
experience.  
 
Table 1: Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) of Top Five Indian States, 2012/13, 2004/05 and 
Average Growth (% Year over Year) 
 *	at	Constant	2004-05	Prices.	
 
Source: Government of India (2014a). 
 
Gujarat is among the Top Five states with regard to Gross State Domestic Product. With the 
exception of Maharashtra, home to the nation’s financial capital Mumbai, all four other best 
performing states registered a similar growth pattern. Gujarat did not outperform its peers in 
the top five. However, while they have done well over the last decade Gujarat has improved 
its relative position vis-à-vis its peers (see Table 1 GSDP 2004-05 in comparison to GSDP 
2012-13). 
 
According to the figures, Gujarat is a high-performing state; although the extent to which this 
is thanks to Modi’s government is disputed. The Economist (2015) points out some important 
facts: `With just 5 per cent of India’s population and 6 per cent of its land mass, it accounts 
for 7.6 per cent of its GDP, almost a tenth of its workforce, and 22 per cent of its exports.´ 
However, the article goes on to mention the state’s natural endowments and endogenous 
advantages: `Climate and geography pushed it towards commerce. Poor rainfall made it hard 
to scratch out a living in farming; a long coastline favoured international trade. Today a 
quarter of India’s sea cargo passes through its ports.´ (ibid.) While other exporting states such 










(in	Rs.	Crore)*	 825,832	 447,944	 443,191	 432,112	 427,219	 	
Gross	State	Domestic	
Product	2004-05																			
(in	Rs.	Crore)*	 415,480	 219,003	 260,841	 224,713	 203,373	 	
Average	Growth											
(%	Year	over	Year)	
9.04	 9.44	 6.85	 10.52	 9.75	 7.97	
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be recognised that delivering and sustaining growth even in a well-off state is not a mean 
achievement.  
 
Concrete accomplishments that Narendra Modi is credited for as Chief Minister, are 
infrastructural improvements, transforming the state from having a deficit in electricity in 
2002 to having a surplus despite growing energy demands (The Economist 2015). The state is 
proud to showcase its 18,000 rural villages, which are connected to the electricity grid and 
with adequate water supply. Providing basic infrastructure and efficient government has been 
seen as a symbol of the Gujarat model (ibid.). This includes making land easily available for 
commercial development, a contentious subject but one, which gained much publicity in 2008 
when Tata Motors, an Indian multinational car manufacturing company, switched from West 
Bengal to Gujarat to set up the factory producing its Nano car. When politics in West Bengal 
and mass agitations mired the project, Narendra Modi stepped in with an offer to hand over 
land in record time. Other companies have followed in its wake, with Ford opening a plant in 
2015 with an investment of over US$1 billion (Gupta 2015). 
 
Among the major manufacturing states, Gujarat has the largest industrial base. The success of 
industrial development in Gujarat has also spawned criticism about crony capitalism, of 
government cosying up and selling out to big business. One such example is that of the Adani 
Group whose flagship project, the Adani Port and Special Economic Zone is India’s largest 
private multi-port operator, stretching out to more than 15,000 hectares of land, which it is 
argued, could only have been acquired thanks to close relations with the ruling party and the 
Chief Minister himself (Sud 2014). It is thus often pointed out that the Gujarat model is 
neither replicable nor desirable as a national model given its big-business bias, arguably at the 
expense of human development. Even more crucially and worrisome however, are the 
arguments that Narendra Modi’s economic programme is based upon anti-secularism and 
divisive politics. It was after all under Modi’s watch (about five months after he assumed 
office) that the state experienced one of its worst bouts of communal violence in 2002 with 
Muslims being the main victims.  
 
A comprehensive evaluation of the year to year changes in governance, human development 
and economic indicators – comparing all big as well as all small States with each other – is 
provided by the India Today Group ´State of the States` reports, available since 2003. The 
Overall Index comprises eight categories: Prosperity and Budget, Governance, Health, 
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Education, Consumer Market, Agriculture, Infrastructure and Investment (See Appendix A.1). 
Rather than using perceptions (e.g. by experts) the indicators draw data solely from official 
and academic sources. For the composite index all eight categories are weighted equally. 
Given that the index tracks year to year changes, states with high values can still be ranked at 
the bottom of the (e.g. 20 big) states, if their improvement within the last year was meagre 
(India Today 2014, 25.) 
 
There are only three states, which managed to stay in the Top Ten in all `State of the States´ 
reports: Kerala, Gujarat and Haryana. Given the term of Modi as Chief Minister of Gujarat 
stretched from the end of 2001 to mid 2014, this success can be attributed to his policies and 
their implementation. In 2011 and 2012 Gujarat was ranked number one – as the overall best 
performing state with regard improvements in the eight categories. India Today claimed, that 
`development has reached all corners of Gujarat. Focusing equally on all sectors is the reason 
behind the state´s current 10 per cent growth, the only one to boast of double digit growth in 
both industry and agriculture.´ (Mahurkar 2012) Positively emphasized were Gujarat´s 
development well-endowed schemes for tribal areas (Vanbandhu Yojana) and coastal regions 
(Sagarkhedu Yojana) as well as investment in civic infrastructure and the cutting out of 
middle-men in aid distribution (ibid.). This success has been sustained and in certain areas 
(like health and education) also improved by the succeeding government under Chief Minister 
Anandiben Patel. Gujarat was again in November 2015 – 18 months after Ms. Patel took over 
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Table 2: India Today´s "State of the States", Ranking 2003 to 2015 with Trends  Source: India Today, several years.  
		 Æ	2003-2015	
Æ	2011-
2015	 Trend	 2015	 2014	 2013	 2012	 2011	 2010	 2009	 2008	 2007	 2006	 2005	 2004	 2003	
Kerala*	 3,0	 3,4	 Û	 2	 3	 1	 2	 9	 4	 4	 4	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Punjab	 4,2	 9,0	 ßßßß	 11	 2	 9	 13	 10	 2	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Tamil	Nadu	 4,7	 6,6	 ß	 20	 1	 3	 4	 5	 3	 3	 2	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	
Gujarat*	 4,8	 2,6	 ÝÝ	 1	 6	 4	 1	 1	 5	 5	 8	 5	 7	 7	 7	 6	
Haryana*	 5,8	 6,0	 Û	 8	 8	 5	 5	 4	 6	 6	 5	 8	 5	 5	 5	 5	
Himachal	Pradesh	 6,3	 12,2	 ßßßßß	 13	 15	 8	 19	 6	 1	 2	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	 3	
Maharashtra	 6,6	 6,4	 Û	 6	 14	 7	 3	 2	 9	 8	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	 7	
Karnataka	 7,8	 8,4	 Û	 3	 9	 13	 10	 7	 7	 7	 7	 7	 8	 8	 8	 8	
Andhra	Pradesh	 9,2	 7,4	 Ý	 9	 5	 2	 9	 12	 10	 10	 11	 10	 10	 11	 11	 10	
Telangana	 -	 -	 -	 10	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Uttarakhand	 11,0	 13,0	 ßß	 21	 4	 16	 16	 8	 11	 11	 9	 9	 9	 9	 9	 -	
Jammu	&	Kashmir	 11,3	 13,8	 ßß	 4	 12	 20	 20	 13	 8	 9	 10	 11	 11	 10	 10	 9	
Rajasthan	 12,8	 14,2	 ß	 17	 11	 6	 18	 19	 12	 12	 12	 12	 12	 12	 13	 11	
Madhya	Pradesh	 13,1	 12,4	 Û	 18	 7	 10	 7	 20	 14	 13	 15	 13	 14	 14	 12	 13	
West	Bengal	 13,1	 12,4	 Û	 12	 13	 14	 6	 17	 13	 14	 14	 15	 13	 13	 14	 12	
Assam	 14,2	 12,8	 Ý	 7	 19	 15	 12	 11	 18	 15	 13	 14	 16	 16	 15	 14	
Odisha	 14,5	 10,2	 ÝÝÝÝ	 5	 16	 19	 8	 3	 15	 17	 17	 18	 18	 18	 18	 16	
Chhattisgarh	 15,1	 14,0	 Ý	 14	 17	 12	 11	 16	 17	 16	 16	 16	 15	 15	 16	 -	
Uttar	Pradesh	 17,1	 17,4	 Û	 19	 18	 17	 15	 18	 16	 18	 18	 17	 17	 17	 17	 15	
Jharkhand	 17,3	 14,8	 ÝÝ	 15	 10	 18	 17	 14	 19	 19	 19	 19	 19	 19	 19	 -	
Bihar	 17,9	 15,2	 ÝÝ	 16	 20	 11	 14	 15	 20	 20	 20	 20	 20	 20	 20	 17	
Trend based on difference between Æ 03-15 and Æ 11-15:      Û less than 1,0 positive or negative change      
Ý 1,0 till 1,9 pos. change     ÝÝ 2,0 till 2,9 pos. change      ÝÝÝ 3,0 till 3,9 pos. change ÝÝÝÝ 4,0 till 4,9 pos. change ÝÝÝÝÝ min. 5,0 pos. change 
ß 1,0 till 1,9 neg. change     ßß 2,0 till 2,9 neg. change      ßßß 3,0 till 3,9 neg. change ßßßß 4,0 till 4,9 neg. change ßßßßß min. 5,0 neg. change 
* The states, which in all years (2003-2015) were in the Top Ten. Narendra Modi was Chief Minister of Gujarat from October 7th, 2001 to May 22nd, 2014   
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It is interesting to note the performance of Gujarat in the eight categories. While it had a 
consistent good performance in areas such as consumer market and agriculture (till 2014), it 
did not perform very well in comparison in education and health (till 2014). (See Table 3.) 
These are also the areas in which the performance of Modi as Prime Minister is called into 
question (Mallet and Crabtree 2015). While this requires further in-depth analysis it is 
intriguing why a pro-business politician like Modi would have neglected education – probably 
the single most important key to individual prosperity and social mobility. 
 
Table 3: Gujarat´s Performance in the Eight Categories of the ´State of the States` 	 2015	 2014	 2013	 2012	 2011	Governance	 21	 5	 4	 11	 17	Health	 4	 17	 5	 9	 11	Education	 2	 7	 13	 12	 16	Agriculture	 20	 7	 2	 5	 4	Infrastructure	 16	 12	 13	 6	 5	Investment	 1	 5	 16	 1	 1	Macro	Economy			(before:	Prosperity	&	budget)	 10	 6	 1	 16	 3	Consumer	Market	 discontinued	 5	 5	 2	 6	Inclusive	Development	 4	 -	 -	 -	 -	Environment	 3	 -	 -	 -	 -	Cleanliness	 1	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Source: India Today (2014, 28-44) and India Today (2015a, 14). 
 
The area in which Modi really outperformed his Chief Minister colleagues is economic 
freedom. The Economic Freedom of the States of India Report provides an index based on (i) 
size of the government – expenditures, taxes and enterprises, (ii) legal structure and security 
of property rights and (iii) regulation of business and labour (Debroy, Bhandari and Aiyar 
2014, 12, 25). It reports: `Gujarat has shown by far the best performance in economic 
freedom. Its score has risen from 0.46 in EFSI 2005 to 0.65 in EFSI 2013, by far the biggest 
increased among states (...). It has improved its ranking among states from fifth position in 
2005 to top position today, and its score of 0.64 is well clear of the others—Tamil Nadu 
comes second, some distance behind, with 0.57, which is no higher than its score back in 
Schottli Pauli 2016 Modi-nomics & the politics of institutional change in the Indian economy. (Accepted Manuscript) 
 
	 12	
2005. Bihar remains at the bottom of league, but its score has improved significantly from 
0.25 to 0.31, and this improvement in percentage terms is heartening.´ (ibid., 25). 
  
Despite concerns about communalism, Hindu nationalism and the influence of the Sangh 
Pariwar, people voted for the BJP in the May 2014 election, nonetheless. For the first time, 
the BJP won more votes than the Congress with about 1 in 3 votes for the BJP while only 
about 1 in 5 chose the Congress. According to most analyses, it was also the first Presidential 
style election in which personality and persona made a key difference, leading to a vote not 
just for the BJP but specifically for Narendra Modi. The allure of Modi, we contend was 
primarily economy-based and thus a credit to the vision and strategy behind Modi-nomics 
which succeeded in catapulting the Gujarat model into the limelight and capturing the mood 
and opportunity for substantive change.  
 
A Generational Shift 
 
The source of Modi-nomics can be said to lie in the story of Modi himself.4 Growing up in 
poverty, having to support his own parents who were doing menial jobs and working his way 
up within the organisational structure of the BJP, the Modi phenomena carries the message 
that hard work and effort can pay off. As a result, Modi-nomics also caters to an aspirational 
class of voters and citizens, targeting and criticising the failings of a decades-old model of 
development and poverty alleviation that created an entrenched system of subsidies, vote-
bank politics and dependency.  
 
Appealing to a new political generation, Modi’s campaign drew heavily on social media and 
made a point of emphasizing a disjuncture with the past. This served the purpose of casting 
his vision as new, in contrast with the ‘old’ world of Congress party dynastic politics, 
symbolised by Rahul Gandhi, himself a member of the post-Independence political 
generation. In keeping with his image of breaking with the past, Modi made a number of 
appointment decisions that distinguished his cabinet: more women than ever before, at an 
average age of 60, younger than ever before, fewer members with prominent family links to 
politics, almost none who had studied abroad (usually a mark of privilege) and at 45 
members, the smallest cabinet in sixteen years. 
 	
4 For recent biographies see Marino (2014) and Menon (2014). 
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Ministerial and other important appointments with particular relevance for the economy 
include Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley (born: 1952), Arvind Subramanian, chief economic 
advisor (born: 1959) and Arvind Panagariya (born: 1952) the Vice Chairman of the newly 
created Niti Aayog, successor to the Planning Commission. Each born within the space of a 
few years (Narendra Modi was born in 1950), they represent an important transformational 
development in India’s politics, a generation of politicians who came of age during the 
repression of the Emergency and who chose to make careers outside the one-party dominant 
system (either within India or by going abroad). This raises some interesting questions to 
which we turn in the following section where we examine Modi and his team in government. 
Is the new post-Independence generation of political decision-makers more inward or outward 
looking than the past? Does Modi-nomics manage to reconcile the tension between Hindutva 
(the ideological basis for Hindu Nationalism) and the embrace of globalization in the 21st 
century, needed to stimulate growth and deliver the promise of job-creation?  
 
III. Turning Right of Centre: A new Institutionalist Analysis of the Modi Government’s 
Economic Policies. 
 
Ideas, Interests and Institutional Change 
To explore the contention that Modi-nomics represents a disjuncture with the past, this section 
draws upon a new institutionalist theory of change as proposed by the economic historian and 
Nobel Prize winner, Douglas C. North. First presented in his book Institutions, institutional 
change and economic performance published in 1990 and later elaborated in his 2005 
publication, Understanding the process of economic change, North combined the ideas of 
historical institutionalism, specifically the notion of path-dependency, with the argument of 
transactions costs, common to economic history. He puts forward an argument that 
incorporates the role of institutional legacies with the transaction costs that arise during 
reform processes, where ideas and interests both explain the success and obstacles to 
institutional change.  
 
In constructing his theory North makes an important distinction between organisations and 
institutions. The former represents agency and the latter is described as the formal and 
informal rules with which agents interact strategically while creating and transforming 
institutions. The mechanisms that generate change include an alteration in the structure of 
incentives and adjustments in agents’ preferences. However, changes or reforms involve high 
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transaction costs and uncertainty. Hence, in order to promote change and galvanise the 
dynamics of change, agents must act strategically in order to mobilise resources and 
legitimate the need for transformative action. This includes mechanisms such as agenda-
setting and the use of veto-power but these in turn, give rise to the dilemmas of collective 
action and unintended consequences.  
 
Institutions take centre stage in North’s seminal works given that they determine the 
constraints to economic as well as political models. Most importantly, “the specific 
institutional constraints dictate the margins at which organizations operate and hence make 
intelligible the interplay between the rules of the game and the behaviour of the actors.” 
(North 1990, 110) This is therefore used to explain why inefficient economies continue to 
underperform thanks to institutional legacies, which give rise to a lock-in effect, making 
change too costly and risky. In order to explain why change happens nonetheless, North 
propounds that ideas and ideologies matter, shaping the mental models that individuals use to 
make sense of the world around them.  
 
From Douglas North therefore three interlinked variables emerge: (1) the institutional 
constraints through which politics frames the incentive structures of an economy. These give 
rise to (2) the organizations that exert agency as filtered through (3) the mental constructs of 
crucial players. The interplay between all three, results in a complex, competitive 
environment where information is limited and cultural conditioning as well as historically 
inherited perceptions, make institutional change incremental and path dependent.  
 
Transferred to the Indian context, we present an analysis of change looking at how far the 
economic policies introduced by the Modi government seek to alter institutional constraints 
by bringing in new organisational actors, changing the rules of the game and adjusting 
informal institutions. Below we focus on two aspects that were often repeated during the 
elections campaign and which we propose, could be key to changing the path of development, 
namely Cooperative Federalism and the Make in India campaign.  
 
Cooperative and Competitive Federalism 
 
Speaking from the perspective of a former Chief Minister, Narenda Modi has often advocated 
the need to empower the States and to encourage cooperation and competition between the 
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States in order to stimulate reforms and investment flows. Since coming to power in 2014, 
two concrete steps have been taken to encourage developments in this direction. On the 1st of 
January 2015 Narendra Modi announced the formation of the NITI Aayog, the National 
Institution for Transforming India as a replacement to the 65-year old Planning Commission.  
Aimed to act more like a think tank rather than a centralised coordinating body, the NITI 
Aayog is designed to give state governments a larger say in decision making, although this is 
not undisputed (Patnaik 2015).  
 
At the first meeting of the NITI Aayog the Prime Minister spoke about new mechanisms that 
would enable the country to move away from a “one size fits all” scheme to a system that 
draws on the strengths and differences across the states. Thus, for example the new 
organisation provides for the appointment of Regional Councils to improve cooperation 
among two or more states facing common problems, or in order to initiate and implement 
joint projects in the area of travel, transportation and tourism.  
 
The ability to win the trust of State leadership is key to Modi’s economic programme given 
that one strategy is to implement many of the controversial reforms via State legislatures. As a 
result, it is telling that Modi has made an effort to engage also with non-BJP Chief Ministers 
heading regional parties such as Naveen Patnaik of Orissa, J Jayalalitha of Tamil Nadu and 
Mamata Banerjee of West Bengal. In fact, Mamata Banerjee accompanied the Prime Minister 
on his recent visit to Bangladesh, which she did not do when former PM Manmohan Singh 
visited.   
 
Another crucial signal from New Delhi has been the decision to follow recommendations of 
the Fourteenth Finance Commission which proposed that 42 per cent of tax revenue be 
devolved to States, an increase from the existing 32 per cent (Government of India 2015b). 
More recently, the government’s e-auctioning of sixty-seven coal blocks highlighted 
improved transparency in the allocation process and also made the promise that a large part of 
the proceeds would go to the state governments, in this case the coal-bearing states of West 
Bengal, Odisha and Jharkand. The Central government has also been encouraging states to 
reform labour laws in order to create jobs, stimulate manufacturing and improve the ease of 
doing business.  
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Despite efforts to uproot entrenched structures, questions have been raised about the extent to 
which the NITI Aayog marks a change from the Planning Commission especially as the 
organisation will answer directly to the Prime Minister. Furthermore, it remains to be seen 
whether controversial reforms can simply be relegated to the State level. For instance, at a 
meeting of the Niti Aayog in July 2015, a number of Chief Ministers were not present when 
the main item on the agenda was the land acquisition bill (India Today, 2015b). 
 
The Make in India Campaign 
 
A much-publicised initiative undertaken by the Modi government has been the ‘Make in 
India’ campaign. Launched by the Prime Minister in September 2014 and spearheaded by the 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, the main objective is to make India attractive 
for manufacturing. Twenty-five sectors including automobiles, chemicals, IT, 
pharmaceuticals are being targeted as opportunity sectors for job creation and skill 
enhancement. In the hope of stimulating investment flows, foreign equity caps in various 
sectors were relayed, for example the 2014 budget announced that 49 per cent foreign direct 
investment would be allowed in the defence sector (up from 26 per cent) and 100 per cent in 
railways infrastructure (up from none).  
 
Aside from inducing foreign investment and improving infrastructure (transport, electricity, 
digital connectivity), a core stated aim of the Make in India campaign, is the need to change 
mindsets or the informal rules and institutions that constitute the Indian business environment. 
The focus on mindsets has found expression in a number of avatars including for example the 
Prime Minister’s statements on the need for society to rethink its attitudes towards the girl 
child and the need to improve notions of hygiene. Most recently, the Defence Minister Mr. 
Manohar Parrikar talked about the need to change mindsets in the Ministry of Defence to 
enhance public-private cooperation and improve indigenous manufacturing capabilities. 
(FICCI 2015). 
 
Regardless of the theme, the need to change mindsets is aimed at altering prejudices and 
patterns of thinking that have hindered innovation and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the 
focus on mindsets has drawn attention to the fact that transforming an economy requires more 
than altering laws and procedures. It also rests upon a change of attitudes across the board of 
economic actors including labour, bureaucrats, employers, businessmen and consumers.  






The hurdles facing the Modi government remain huge. Manufacturing output accounts for 
only 15 per cent of national output, compared with 32 per cent in China and 34 per cent in 
Thailand. Overall costs in India remain high, undermining the government’s bid to become a 
labour-intensive manufacturing destination – for instance according to the Boston Consulting 
Group (2014) manufacturing in India is only five per cent cheaper than for instance in 
Mexico. Infrastructure projects lag behind most other Asian countries and India has failed so 
far to create clusters of companies as has occurred very successfully in China, for instance 
around the Pearl River Delta.  
 
India’s economy has internationalised considerably, the openness index (share of trade in 
GDP) has tripled over the last thirty years, accompanied by declining tariff levels. 
Nonetheless, the share of exports, especially for manufactured goods, in India’s economy has 
grown slowly. The government’s own Economic Survey of 2014–15 identifies as a major 
concern, the country’s “muted export growth" and trade challenges (Government of India 
2015a, 16 and 34). 
 
Meanwhile discussions continue to rage as to the extent to which the Modi government is and 
can be truly market-oriented in its reforms.5 On the one hand the question pertains to the 
political capacity of the government to push through controversial laws and on the other hand, 
to the ideology underpinning the government’s initiatives. While Modi and certain cabinet 
members such as the Finance Minister are regarded as liberalisers, traditionalist within the 
ranks of the BJP or from influential organisations such as the RSS do not necessarily share the 
view that greater globalisation and industrialization is the need of the hour.  
 
A recent report by the Peterson Institute argues that many countries have used external 
liberalization to promote and lock-in domestic reform (Bergsten 2015). The examples are 
given of China when it joined the World Trade Organisation and Japan under Prime Minister 
Abe who has made Japanese membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an integral 
component and driver of his economic recovery strategy. In both cases, the report argues, 
economic diplomacy to integrate the respective countries more deeply within the global 	
5 See the discussion in Fernandes (2014, 12-18) on Modi’s pro-market credentials. 
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economy was bold and risked opposition at home. However, the decisions strengthened and 
institutionalised reform processes at home. The report argues that the Modi government needs 
to take similarly bold action to signal India’s commitment to reforms and globalisation. It can 
be contended that economic diplomacy is in fact a current priority of the government. Prime 
Minister Modi has made a record number of foreign visits to countries where the emphasis 
has been on attracting investments and enhancing industrial collaboration. Interestingly, on 
his trips abroad Modi has sought to play both cards, that of the internationalist and the 
indigene – eager to tap into high-tech industry and cutting-edge innovation as well as appeal 
to the economic success of a prosperous Indian diaspora. 
 
The paper has argued that Modi-nomics is founded upon concrete preferences in economic 
policy, a record of administrative experience and transformative leadership. The creation of 
NITI Aayog as a replacement to the Planning Commission and the launch of a concerted 
campaign to boost manufacturing were used as illustrations of Modi-nomics in application. 
Both showcase the administration’s emphasis on the need for altering the models and modes 
of thinking and acting, in terms of recasting state-centre relations and re-directing resources 
and efforts towards industry and entrepreneurship as a means of job-creation and economic 
growth. Formal institutions need to change as well as informal practices – emphasised in the 
government’s slogans of changing mindsets. However, adjusting models of economic 
development face strong path dependency effects, including institutionalised vested interests, 
entrenched mentalities and embedded organisational forces. It remains to be seen whether 
Modi-nomics can truly galvanise change by focusing on the economy or if it will be eclipsed 
by the necessary rigmarole of politics. 
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A.1. Indicators of the State of the States Index 
 
`Prosperity and budget – (i) percentage of population above poverty line, (ii) percentage of urban 
population, (iii) per capita capital expenditure, (iv) inflation, (v) per capita debt, (vi) per capita Gross 
State Domestic Product (GSDP).  
 
Governance – (i) number of policemen per lakh people, (ii) ratio of cases filed to pending cases in 
district and lower courts, (iii) share of murders to total cognizable crimes, (iv) share of kidnappings to 
total cognizable crimes, (v) share of rapes and molestation to total cognizable crimes.  
 
Health – (i) infant mortality rate (IMR), (ii) ratio of male IMR to female IMR, (iii) percentage of 
births assisted by trained personnel, (iv) percentage of households having tap water as principal 
source of water, (v) registered doctors per million population (vi) sex ratio, (vii) per capita expenditure 
on health and family welfare by state government.  
 
Education – (i) literacy rate, (ii) proportion of 10-plus children having completed primary education, 
(iii) ratio of boys to girls in elementary school, (iv) teacher-student ratio, (v) expenditure on 
elementary education on every six to 14-year-old child.  
 
Consumer Market – (i) households owning television, (ii) proportion of middle class and affluent 
households in urban areas, (iii) proportion of middle class and affluent households in rural areas, (iv) 
per capita deposits in banks, (v) per capita ownership of two wheelers.  
 
Agriculture – (i) percentage of cultivated area under cash crops, (ii) agriculture GSDP per rural 
population, (iii) agriculture electricity consumption per rural population, (iv) food grain yield, (v) 
loans extended to farmers and net irrigated area.  
 
Infrastructure – (i) percentage of households with electricity, (ii) percentage of villages connected 
with pucca roa, (iii) per capita road length, (iv) bank branches, (v) LPG connections, (vi) post offices, 
(vii) telephones.  
 
Investment – (i) per capita capital expenditure, (ii) commercial bank credit, (iii) gross capital 
formation in manufacturing, (iv) ratio of factories to number of disputes, (v) ratio of industrial 
workers to urban 15-59 population, (vi) percentage of sick SSIs.´ 
 
Source: India Today (2014, 25).  
 
Note that there has been a change in the dimensions used for the State of the States Index in 2015: 
Prosperity and budget as well as consumer market have been absorbed in the new dimensions named 
macro economy and inclusive development (with new indicators like progress of financial inclusion 
scheme or ratio of women representatives in panchayats, local government assemblies, in comparison 
to female population). New are the two dimensions, environment (the inverse concentrations of SO2, 
NO2, RSPM as well as tree cover as percentage of geographical area) and cleanliness (the percentages 
of households with improved sanitation facility, improved source of drinking water and with clean fuel 
for cooking as well as schools with separate toilet facility for girls). 
 
Source: India Today (2015a, 14). 
